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DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE ISSUE OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN BRAZIL 1987-
1994 
 
ABSTRACT: 
The paper describes the development of Brazilian positions and policies related to the issue of 
climate change during the 1987-1994 period. The main focus of the paper is on the political 
conflicts connected to the most important Brazilian source of greenhouse gas emissions, 
namely deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia. It is argued that the election of president Collor 
as a new Brazilian president in 1989 spurred the transition to a more cooperative position on 
the issue of climate change. This happened because Collor perceived the improvement of 
Brazil´s international environmental record as an essential precondition for the fulfillment of 
his economic liberalization programme, and because his position as the first democratically 
elected president since 1961 facilitated an increased political distance to the military and 
regional business groups sceptical to such reforms. However, partly because of resistance 
from these interests and the powerful Ministry of External Affairs (Itamaraty), and partly 
because of the weakness of the sections of the Brazilian environmental movement with an 
interest in the Amazon region, Collor´s attempts to change Brazil´s international role in the 
UNCED negotiations and to launch a forest policy for the Amazon region inspired by 
considerations for climate change were partially crippled.  
 
1. Introduction 
During the late 1980s, Brazil became the environmental villain of an emerging global 
ecological order. The Sarney government´s (1985-1990) position on the issue of climate 
change was among the most defensive and hostile in the G-77 group. While principally 
denying any responsibility for global environmental problems, the country was forced by a 
coalition of the United States, the European Community, multilateral agencies and 
international NGOs to adopt half-hearted reforms that addressed the problem of climate 
change. Between 1990 and 1992, under the Collor government, the country´s attitude to the 
climate issue was reversed in a much more cooperative direction. At the same time, efforts to 
cope with Brazil´s contribution to the greenhouse problem were implemented with more 
vigour. This phase culminated with the arrangement of the UNCED conference in Rio de 
Janeiro in 1992 and the impeachment of president Collor in September 1992. Under president 
Itamar Franco, there was another reversal of Brazil´s environmental policies back to the 
defensive positions and the half-hearted efforts of the Sarney era. 
 In this paper, argue that these changes were influenced by a combination of special 
characteristics of the sources of greenhouse gas emissions in Brazil and the state and civil 
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society forces connected to these sources. The lion´s share of these emissions come from 
deforestation in the vast region of Brazilian Amazonia.1 But the political structures that 
linked the various interests created by this emission profile with federal decision-making 
changed considerably with the progress of democratization in Brazil. In section 3-5, I will 
explore the configurations of these forces with an emphasis on the contrasts between the 
Sarney and Collor governments. A main point is that the process of democratization in Brazil 
implied a more progressive policy related to the question of climate change as the influence 
of the military and their allies was weakened.  But prior to this discussion, some of the 
charactertistics of the distribution of greenhouse gas emissions from Brazil on various 
anthropogenic sources and geographical regions will be discussed.  
 
 
2. Greenhouse gas emissions from Brazil - conflicting perceptions 
At one level, the issue of climate change is a problem of the natural sciences, characterized by 
the struggle for reduced uncertainty and refined methods of data analysis. However, at 
another level, our perceptions of the issue is influenced by the strategies of several groups of 
actors, presenting conflicting versions of an uncertain reality.  
 Worries about climate change in Brazil predate the scientific advances in atmosphere 
sciences from the late 1970s.2 Such worries were especially focused on regional climate 
change as a consequence of deforestation in the Amazon region. Potter et al. (1975) simulated 
the climatic consequences of general deforestation in the zone 5 degrees N to 5 degrees S (of 
which Amazonia took the lion´s share). Main outcomes in this model were drops of 
temperature in this zone along with changes in rainfall. Molion (1976) and Salati et al. (1979) 
warned that reduced rainfall might be the outcome of continued deforestation in Amazonia; a 
possibility also reflected upon in by current political commentators (Bourne 1978). 
Speculations about the implications of deforestation for global climate change through the 
reduction of biomass and increased emission of CO2 to the atmosphere also emerged in this 
period (Bolin 1977, Adams et. al. 1977, Wong 1978): For Amazonia, the issue was raised in 
connection with the enormous amounts of biomass represented by the Amazon rainforest.3  
                                                 
1 The term «Brazilian Amazonia» as used in most texts usually has one of two meanings. One is the «North-
region» as defined by the Brazilian census agency IBGE, including the states of Pará, Amazonas, Rondônia, 
Acre, Amapá and Roraima. A second, which is used in this chapter, is the term «Legal Amazonia» used by the 
Brazilian regional development agency SUDAM  (according to Complementary Law  No. 31 of 1977) also 
includes Tocantins, Mato Grosso and a large share of Maranhão.  
2Even though connections between human activity and global climate change as a consequence of increased 
anthropogenic emissions of carbondioxide has been an object of scientific speculation since the 18th century, the 
launching of the World Climate Programme by World Meteorological Organization in 1979 was the first large-
scale effort to estimate the seriousness of this problem (McCormick 1989:190). 
3Salati & Ribeiro (1979) estimated the Amazon region to represent about 20 percent of the planet´s organic 
carbon reservoir.  
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 Though the net contribution of rainforest removal vs. emissions from energy was 
clouded with uncertainty during the 1980s (Fearnside 1985:80-81), most estimates concluded 
that the burning of fossil fuels was far more important than the removal of biomass from 
tropical forests (Dobson et al. 1989; The Economist, 11. February 1989:19).  
 Parts of the reason for a very strong focus on Brazil and its share of Amazonia in 
relation to the global climate, in spite of the apparently moderate impact of tropical 
deforestation, was  new discoveries of the intensity of deforestation in the Amazon region in 
1988. Early this year, a research team from the Brazilian Forestry Development Institute 
(IBDF) and the Brazilian Space Agency (INPE) presented a report indicating that 325,000 
fires had been detected in Brazilian Amazonia by the  NOAA-9 meteorological satellite 
(Setzer et al. 1988). From the total number of fires, they concluded that in 1987 deforestation 
had demolished 80,000 km2 of native forest, an area corresponding to the size of Austria. In 
the next turn, these estimates provided the basis for other reports that concluded that 
Amazonian deforestation was gaining an enormous, exponential momentum (Mahar 1989, 
Myers 1989), and that the country was a key contributor to global greenhouse gas emissions. 
The prestigious World Resources Institute in Washington concluded in their 1990 survey of 
the global environment that deforestation in Brazil in 1987 accounted for greenhouse gas 
emissions larger than the combined use of fossil energy fuels in the United States (World 
Resources Institute 1990:346). These assumptions brought Brazil to the top of total and per 
capita emissions of CO2 among the larger nations of the capitalist world, as demonstrated by 
the table below published by World Resources Institute in 1990: 
 
Table 1: Ranking of gross per capita emissions of carbondioxide  in the WRI 1990 
estimate - larger nations/capitalist world4
 
       Deforestation as 
    Per capita emissions percentage of total 
Country   CO2 (metric tons) emissions of CO2 
 
1. Brazil    9.1   96   
2. United States   5.0     0.5 
3. Canada    4.3     0 
 
Source: World Resources Institute 1990:346, table 24.1. 
 
These estimates provoked enormous attention to Brazil and its contribution to climate change 
all over the world. In September 1989, Amazonia was the frontcover story of an issue of Time 
                                                 
4The figures presented in this table reflect information given by WRI in 1990. Later estimates for all three 
nations in the table may deviate considerably from these figures due to improvements in emission estimates.  
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Magazine (Time Magazine, 18. September 1989).5 State leaders, like president Mitterand and 
chancellor Helmut Kohl, as well as rock star Sting, directed their attention to Amazonia.  
 In 1988 and 1989, the global discourse that linked Amazonia and climate change was 
departing from realities. Along with the emergence of Brazil as the villain of climate change, 
critical examinations of former deforestation estimates in Amazonia unveiled methodological 
problems in the interpretations of remote sensing images. The satellite images, which 
provided the basis of the Brazilian Space Agency´s estimates, were based on spots of fire 
detected by infrared sensors. Such sensors are easily saturated by only small spots of fires, 
facilitating exaggeration of the area covered by fire (Fearnside 1990b:214-215). In addition, 
Mahar´s (1989) deforestation estimates were flawed by empirically ungrounded exponential 
extrapolations of 1980 observations, grossly overestimating deforestation in several 
Amazonian regions (Fearnside 1990a:459-460).  
 These facts were increasingly recognized by scientists in the late 1980s, but Brazil 
proved unable to exploit these discoveries to argue convincingly in favor of more  moderate 
estimates of the country´s contribution to global warming. In the first place, the Sarney 
government´s response to the global outcry that came in the wake of the new estimates was 
politically unwise. The Brazilian Space Agency was ordered to make a crash estimate of 
deforestation refuting especially Mahar´s widely cited study, which gained credibility from 
being published as a World Bank paper. However, the study which the Sarney administration 
called for, received much criticism. First, it used a questionable methodology to minimize 
deforestation and greenhouse gas emissions from Amazonian deforestation. The report 
concluded that total deforestation in the Amazon region was less than half of the 12 percent 
suggested by Dennis Mahar (O Globo, 6. April 1989). But it came to this conclusion by 
subtracting «ancient» deforestation taking place before 1970. Furthermore, a second edition 
published 2. May 1989 calculated deforestation as a share of the total area of Legal 
Amazonia,6 and not originally forested  Amazonia. As Legal Amazonia also includes large 
savannas, the numerator and denumerator refers to different areas, grossly underestimating 
total deforestation. Second, there are strong indications that the scientific process behind the 
figures was deliberately «fixed» to still international criticism of Brazil. Technicians at INPE 
complained that the report was prepared too rapidly, and that the scientific staff was excluded 
                                                 
5The frontcover, which portrays a skull of flames devouring a forest containing innocent birds, panthers and 
beautiful snakes, confirms  a popular image of Amazonia as an unpopulated, tropical paradise threatened by 
civilization. The poor urban populations of the large Amazonian cities as well as the rural poor at the 
agricultural frontier are not included in this image. 
6 The term «Amazonia» as used in most texts usually has one of two meanings. One is the «North-region» as 
defined by the Brazilian census agency IBGE, including the states of Pará, Amazonas, Rondônia, Acre, and 
Amapá in addition to the federal territory of Roraima. The definition  «Legal Amazonia» that is used by the 
Brazilian planning agency for Amazonia, SUDAM, after 1979 also includes Mato Grosso, Tocantins and large 
parts of  Maranhão. Legal Amazonia makes up more than 50 percent of the Brazilian territory. 
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from the final data analysis (Anderson 1990:20, Folha de São Paulo, 8. May 1989:C-3). This 
provoked strong criticism from the national and global scientific community (Folha de São 
Paulo, 8. May 1989:C-3) and undermined the Brazilian government´s credibility. 
 The clumsiness of the Sarney regime´s handling of deforestation estimates thus tended 
to take away attention from the new and more moderate estimates that arrived somewhat later. 
In these estimates, Brazil´s contribution to the greenhouse effect were drastically decreased 
along with huge reductions of deforestation rates. In the 1992 version of «World Resources», 
carbon dioxide emissions from Brazil were reduced by more than 50 percent as compared to 
the 1990 estimate. Deforestation was still the overwhelming cause of greenhouse gas 
emissions from Brazil, making up about 77 percent of total emissions, but did no longer 
grossly outpace total emissions from the other major «deforesting nation», Indonesia, or the 
per capita emissions of other countries with large natural forests (World Resources 1992:348-
49, table 24.2, Fearnside 1992). Furthermore, reports based on improved methods for 
measuring deforestation concluded that the years 1987-1988 were exceptional years in terms 
of deforestation. Special economic factors had contributed to a climax of biomass burning in 
the Amazon region just when global attention to the problem of climate change emerged.7
 A more general problem connected to Brazil´s position as a developing country, was 
its inability to influence the situation of  the disappearing tropical moist forests at the top of 
the international agenda. For Brazilian citizens, local pollution problems are much more of a 
threat to the population than the spectre of climate change, perhaps with the lack of basic 
sanitation for the majority of the population as the most important problem (Viola 1992:4). 
The biased representation of human needs represented by the ascendancy of climate change to 
the top of the global agenda was also reproduced by the currents of international 
environmental financing. It is far easier for Brazilian NGOs and researchers to obtain funding 
on forest-related projects than on projects related to improvements of basic sanitation.8
 The outcome of the conflict over realities was, however, that Brazilian Amazonia 
came to occupy a very high position on the global ecological agenda. The region´s 
contribution to global warming was one of the chief reasons for this. In the next turn, this led 
to very strong international pressure on Brazil to change the country´s policies in the region in 
a more environmentally benign direction. As we shall see, the development of Brazil´s 
policies on climate change took place in the intersection between this pressure and domestic 
politics.  
                                                 
7More recent estimates conclude that annual average deforestation during the years 1978-1988 was 22,000 km2. 
Between 1989 and 1990, the deforestation rate declined to 13,800 km2/year, and has since declined further to 
just above 10,000 km2/year (Fearnside 1992:5). 
8Own interviews with Brazilian NGOs October 1992 and November 1993. For a more general discussion of this 
topic, see Agarwal & Narain 1991 and Beckerman 1992. 
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3. The Sarney government and climate change 
Deforestation in the Amazon region is heavily influenced by development policies initiated in 
the early days of the military regime (1964-1985). In 1966, the military introduced a regional 
development policy for the Amazon region characterized by infrastructure extension and huge 
subsidies and tax breaks for  of industries, cattle ranching and mining (Hecht & Cockburn 
1989, Branford & Glock 1985, Pompermayer 1984). This policy was continued with only 
minor changes through the 1970s and early 1980s. The main political motive was territorial 
security. The vast and unpopulated Amazon region was perceived as vulnerable to attacks 
from hostile foreign powers or as a potential nest for communist subversion (Allen 1992).  
 In addition to huge public investments in roads and hydroelectric plants, the military 
development policy inspired a wave of private investments in cattle ranching, mining and 
industry. While investments in industry were spatially concentrated in the Manaus free-trade 
zone, investments in cattle ranching and mining were more dispersed, having a stronger 
ecological impact.9 The most important initial investors were large companies from São 
Paulo, Brazil´s south-eastern industrial powerhouse, and to a smaller extent, transnational 
companies based in the US and Europe. In addition to the distribution of generous incentives 
to private investors, public investments in road-building tended to encourage private 
investments as land values increased dramatically when road access was assured. In 
combination with strong general tax incentives for agricultural investments and rules of land 
allocation that provides land title after the size of cleared forest area, these policies 
contributed to massive forest clearing in the Amazon region (Binswanger 1991). From the 
1970s, the prospects of huge speculative profits increasingly also attracted investors from the 
Amazon region itself, independent of the subsidy programmes. Though being of local and 
regional origin, the majority of these investors were also large-scale ranchers, manifesting the 
tendency towards land concentration in the Amazon region.10 This makes assumptions about 
                                                 
9The extension of cattle ranching is seemingly closely linked to deforestation in the Amazon region. May & 
Reis (1993:13-15) correlate planted pastures to Amazonian deforestation and found a very strong spatial 
covariation between concentrations of planted pasture and deforestation. However, as they based their 
calculations on IBGE data only covering agropastoral establishments, these data do not give information about 
non-agricultural causes of deforestation else than the construction of hydroelectric dams, which takes a quite 
modest share of total deforestation. But generally, there is a long-standing and broad consensus on the very 
strong effects of pasture expansion on deforestation, and that the deceleration of such expansion is the main 
prerequisite for a decrease of deforestation rates. (Serrão & Toledo 1990:196, Fearnside 1989). 
10The increase of land-use in Amazonia in the period until the late 1980s was first and foremost the outcome of 
the expansion of planted pastures (May & Reis 1993:13, table 4).  There has also been a strong tendency 
towards the concentration of rural establishment in larger units. In the North Region and Mato Grosso in 1985, 
large agropastoral establishments (area greater than 500 hectares) covered 73,6 percent of the North Region and 
Mato Grosso, while small (area below 100 ha) and medium sized (area between 500 and 100 ha) establishments 
by and large divided the remaining area between them (May & Reis 1993:19). However, the predominance of 
 
6
a close covariation between poverty and greenhouse gas emissions in Brazil much more 
problematic than commonly assumed. 
 In the middle of the 1980s, this trend of regional development reached a climax 
through two very large projects. The first project was the Great Carajás project which 
included a broad-based development of industries and agriculture in the eastern Amazon 
region. This project was organized around the infrastructure constructed in connection with 
the establishment of the extremely large Carajás iron mine.11 In addition to the extension of 
large-scale ranching and agriculture, the Great Carajás project included a proposal for the 
construction of a series of pig-iron smelters utilizing virgin rain forest as its source of energy 
(Hall 1989). The net impact of the project, which was fuelled by special subsidies, on the 
forests of the region was predicted to be extremely devastating in terms of deforestation 
(Fearnside 1986). The second project was the POLONOROESTE immigration project, which 
consisted of the construction of the pavement of a 1,500 km road connecting Cuiabá at the 
south-western fringe of the Amazon region with the capital of the capital of the western 
Amazonian state of Rondônia, Porto Velho. In connection to this road, 39 centers for planned 
agricultural immigration were established to attract thousands of immigrants to an area 
covering the whole state of Rondônia and the northern section of the state of Mato Grosso; an 
area equal to about 75 percent of the surface of France (Rich 1988:9). The outcome was a 
totally uncontrolled process of immigration into the region. From 1980 to the peak year of 
1986, the annual number of immigrants entering Rondônia increased from 28,320 to 165,899 
(Martine 1990:30). Between 1978 and 1989, deforested area of Rondônia increased from 1.78 
percent of state area to 13.34 percent, implying the removal of about 27,000 km2 of forest  
(INPE 1992). Both the POLONOROESTE project and the Carajás central mining project 
which was the cornerstone of the Greater Carajás Project, received World Bank financing. 
 These megaprojects continued uninterrupted during the first years of the Sarney 
government. In addition to its alliance with the military (Flynn 1993, Zirker & Henberg 
1994), the conservative Sarney government had important political allies among federal 
deputies, senators and governors from the Amazon region.12 As the Brazilian electoral system 
favors votes from remote regions like Amazonia, these allies enjoyed an influence out of 
                                                                                                                                                        
planted pastures on medium-sized and its substantial share of small agripastoral establishments suggest that 
livestock is an important source of income  among all strata of Amazonian producers.  
11In addition to the establishment of the mine south of the city of Belém, this included the giant Tucuruí 
hydroelectric dam, the Ponta da Madeira deep sea port near the city of São Luis, and a 900 km. railroad 
connecting the mine and the port. 
12Sarney was  a former top figure of the military´s party ARENA, but created his own right-wing party, PFL 
(The Liberal Party) during the process of democratization. He became president because the first non-military 
president which was elected by the 1985 electoral college, Tancredo Neves, died of heart attack the same year. 
While Neves was a highly respected democrat and was elected by an electoral college that sensationally chose to 
act against the advice of the military, Sarney served as a military alibi in this  «package solution».  
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proportion with the region´s demographical and economic importance.13 This influence 
contributed mainly to improve the basis of right-wing allies of the military forces, and to 
guarantee a very strong coalition in favour of continuation of the commercial «development» 
of the Amazon region (Hurrell 1992, Zirker & Henberg 1994:266-267). In 1985, before the 
relevance of Amazonia for global environmental problems was fully recognized by the 
international community, a comprehensive strategy for increased environmental protection in 
the Amazon region had been proposed as a federal bill to the congress in 1985, after 
discussions dating back to 1979. Apparently, the mentioned  coalition was already operative 
in the national assembly. The bill was never voted upon by Congress, probably due to fierce 
resistance by business interests in the region (Vieira 1994:108). 
 As the connection between deforestation and global environmental problems became 
well-known, and the surprisingly high estimates of Amazonian deforestation exploded in 
media all over the world, the Sarney government was exposed to mounting international 
pressure. The emergence of such pressure was facilitated by transnational channels connected 
to an ongoing campaign of international NGO protests against World Bank financed projects 
in developing countries. These channels emerged during the 1980s. In this period, US 
environmental NGOs started to inform the two chambers of the US Congress about the 
destructive effects of a series of  projects in rainforest areas financed both by the World Bank 
itself and other regional development banks.14  24 Senate hearings in which the policies of the 
Multilateral Development Banks were main topics, were held in the US Congress from 1983 
to 1986 (Rich, undated:20). Both the POLONOROESTE and the Carajás mining project were 
focussed upon in these hearings. The campaign was supported by a strategy of networking 
between US NGOs and NGOs both in Western Europe and in developing countries.  In 
Brazil, a broad network of activists including prominent individuals  like José Lutzenberger15, 
NGOs organized around Amazonian rubber tappers16, like Instituto de Estudos Amazonicos  
and Conselho Nacional de Seringueiros,  and NGOs organized around Amazonia´s 
                                                 
13This was a deliberate strategy to increase right-wing influence by the retreating military regime in the early 
1980s. The poor and peripheral regions of Brazil are characterized by the dominance of right-wing rural 
oligarchies who dominate through electoral clientelism. 
14Greenpeace International, Friends of the Earth, Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental Defense 
Fund, the Sierra Club, Environmental Policy Institute and Cultural Survival were important NGOs participating 
in the campaign. The campaign was coordinated by Bruce Rich (Natural Resources Defense Council), Barbara 
Bramble (National Wildlife Federation) and Brent Blackwelder (Environmental Policy Institute) (Arnt & 
Schwartzman 1992:112). 
15Lutzenberger was leader of the first modern ecological movement in Brazil, AGAPAN, founded in Porto 
Alegre (capital of the state of Rio Grande do Sul) in 1971. This required great personal courage, as it was done 
in the most repressive period of the military regime (Viola 1988:214). 
16The rubber tappers are independent collectors of latex from the dense stands of rubber trees of Western 
Amazonia. Especially in the state of Acre, they oppose the expansion of cattle ranching. 
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indigenous populations like União das Nações Indigenas  (UNI).17 As World Bank and 
Interamerican Development Bank projects were revised to include firmer environmental 
obligations mainly because of the activity of US directors in the board, pressure against the 
bank was translated as pressure against the Brazilian government from the bank. From 1985, 
this included temporal discontinuations of funding for the POLONORESTE programme, 
demands for detailed environmental provisions in energy programmes, temporal 
discontinuations of funding for further road extension in the Western Amazon region and 
demand for improved environmental plans. A very important blow to the Brazilian 
government was the indefinite discontinuation of negotiations on a very important USD 500 
mill. loan for a series of energy projects in early 1989. This energy programme included the 
construction of a series of very large hydroelectric dams in Amazonia that threatened to flood 
vast areas of pristine forest (Arnt & Schwartzman 1992:115-116).18
 The pressure from NGOs also activated bilateral pressure from Brazil´s main trading 
partners and investors. US politicians like senator Al Gore tried to link environmental reforms 
in Amazonia to a more liberal debt regime and the inflow of fresh investments in the 
Brazilian economy (Correio Braziliense, 18. January 1989:12, Hurrell 1992:406). 
 The response of the Sarney government to this pressure may be divided into two 
periods. The period until the second half of 1988 was characterized by the government´s 
uncompromising refusal to recognize and address the environmental problems created by its 
policies in the Amazon region. Then a period of cautious reform was introduced with the 
introduction of some planning study groups for the region set up in October 1988, ultimately 
ending up in a series of reform in 1989 and early 1990. Though some of these reforms implied 
significant breaks with former policies, the govnernment´s foreign policy positions on climate 
change and the environment, as well as policies related to Amazonia´s indigenous 
populations, remained unchanged. 
 
3.1.  The Sarney government before 1988 - intransigency and increasing pressure 
Before the second half of 1988, the Sarney government refused altogether to accept the 
relevance of its policies in Brazilian Amazonia for the global environment. This refusal was 
based on two main perceptions of Amazonia´s position in the international system.  
                                                 
17According to Albert (1992:36), Amazonia is home to about 60 percent of the 236,000 Brazilian Indians. 98 
percent of the total area of Indian lands (794,000 km2) is located within the region. Large areas of Indian lands 
in the Amazon are heavily forested and among the most interesting sections of Amazonia because of their 
richness in plant and animal species (World Bank 1994:283). 
18The message about the closure of negotiations on the power sector loan became publicly known in Brazil the 
same day as the Sarney government was insulted in public by an UNEP leader for its defensive environmental 
policies. In the newspaper O Globo, 31. March 1989:7, these events are reported on the same newspaper page, 
providing a striking impression of the intensive pressure on the Brazilian government.  
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 First, the government tended to perceive international considerations over the 
greenhouse effect and Amazonia as an international plot to challenge Brazil´s sovereignty 
over the region. Such considerations were based on the military´s assumption that the region 
was threatened by foreign powers. Seemingly far-fetched in the international context of the 
1980s, this position was grounded on a longer historical view. When Amazonia was the 
center of the soaring world trade in rubber around the turn of the century, a joint plan by the 
United States and Bolivia to break Brazilian control over transportation by declaring the 
Amazon river as international area provoked strong tension in the region, ultimately leading 
to Brazil´s successful overtaking of the Bolivian region of Acre in 1903 (Hecht & Cockburn 
1989:66-72). Also during World War II, worries over Amazonia´s sovereignty surfaced. As 
Brazil declared war against Germany in 1942, the United States and Brazil joined forces to 
prevent German infiltration of the region. This cooperation involved the construction of 
airfields and the launching of a Brazilian expedition into the Amazon region (Cowell 
1990:17-22).  
 Second, there was also a feeling that the environmental campaign was launched by the 
industrial nations to prevent Brazil from becoming a world power assisted by the natural 
resources of Amazonia (Miyamoto 1989, Hurrell 1992:405). This position was especially 
connected to the north-south perceptions of the traditionally very strong and influential 
Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (also called the Itamaraty). The Itamaraty perceived 
several international issues through the lenses of a broad north-south conflict over global 
resources; a perception which included the exploitation of Amazonia´s natural resources 
(Miayamoto 1989). 
 These perceptions motivated a very defensive policy on the Amazon before the second 
half of 1988.  The scheme of fiscal incentives for cattle ranching, pointed out by foreign and 
national critics as unprofitable and a main motive for deforestation, continued unchanged in 
spite of its costs in a situation of debt-imposed fiscal austerity. The  forest policy for the 
Amazon region outlined in the 1965 forest law and later amendments remained 
unimplemented, and the agency responsible for its implementation, the Braziliand Forest 
Institute (IBDF) paralyzed by decreasing funding (Prado 1986:13-14) and a continued lack of 
political backing.  Also policies relevant to preservation of forest areas for Amazonia´s 
indigenous populations were shaped with an eye to commercial interests. The National Indian 
Foundation (FUNAI), responsible for the Indian tribes of the Amazon region, was widely 
known as a corrupt bastion for military and mining interests (Albert 1992). 
 The foreign policy of Brazil on the Amazon issue and its effects on the global climate 
was extremely defensive and anti-cooperative, and continued to be so during the whole 
Sarney presidency. The government´s attitude to Amazonia´s contribution to climate change 
was entirely shaped with an eye to the region´s importance for the military. For example, 
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president Sarney withdrew his participation in the global conference on the protection of the 
atmosphere in Hague in 1989 after a meeting with his military ministers (Zirker & Henberg 
1994:266). Furthermore, the Brazilian delegation to the meeting argued against any 
references to Amazonia in the final communique and against president Mitterand´s suggestion 
to provide the UN with authority to intervene in cases in which global environmental interests 
were threatenened (Hurrell 1992:406). Proposals suggesting debt-for-nature swaps as a 
combined remedy for Brazil´s debt-burden and the country´s contribution to global 
environmental problems were forcefully denounced by the government as attempts of foreign 
intervention. The refusal of the World Bank to continue negotiations on the energy sector 
loan in 1989 was met by furious protests by Brazil, deviating from the rules of diplomatic 
conduct in such cases (O Estado de São Paulo, 7. March 1989:47). Foreign NGOs were 
suspected to be spearheads of an imperialist take-over of the region by the military (O Estado 
de São Paulo, 9. February 1989:13). Though mostly focussed on foreign influences, the 
classical army «think-tank», the Superior War College (ESG) also identified Brazilian artists, 
intellectuals, the church and transnational companies as a possible «fifth column» behind the 
international campaign against Brazil (Folha de São Paulo, 29. May 1990:A-4). 
 
3.2. The Sarney government from the second half of 1988 - cautious action 
In the second half of 1988, the Brazilian government started to respond to external pressure, 
which was perceived to have reached a climax in the middle of 1988. It was clear that 
Brazilian trade, the debt regime and a revitalization of foreign investments in the country was 
dependent on  improvements of Brazil´s record in Amazonia.  
In October 1988, president José Sarney held his first speech related to the 
environment, in which broad policy changes related to Amazonia were introduced (Hurrell 
1992:409). A new plan related to environmental protection in Amazonia was decreed  the 
12th of October 1988 and called «The Programme for the defence of the complex of 
ecosystems in Legal Amazonia». It was marketed under the label «Nossa Natureza»  
(Portuguese for «Our Nature»). The aims of the programme were addressing Amazonian 
problems broadly, including to restrain predatory actions, to discipline the exploitation of the 
region, to regenerate the region´s ecosystems and to protect indigenous populations and the 
region´s rubber tappers (Decree No. 96.944/88). Most remarkably, concerns for the global 
climate emerged as environmental policy motives for the first time with the Nossa Natureza 
plan. In the report from the executive committee of Nossa Natureza in February 1989, this is 
stated clearly (SADEN 1989:26, my translation from Portuguese): 
 
«The destrucion of tropical moist forests, in particular the Amazon forest, attract the interest of industrialized 
countries, not only because they constitute the ecosystems with the most biological species, but above all 
because of their possible influences on the global climate.» (my Italic).  
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The core of the first phase of the programme was the establishment of six interministerial 
working groups on topics related to environmental problems in Amazonia.19 The groups were 
coordinated by an executive interministerial committee headed by a general from the National 
Defense Secretariat (SADEN). 
 The establishment of the interministerial working groups was introduced together 
with a decree that also prohibited the approval of fresh fiscal incentives  for ranching and 
agriculture in Legal Amazonia and the Atlantic Rainforest for a period of 90 days, later on 
indefinitely. The decree also banned the disbursement of official agricultural credit for new 
ranching projects in these areas. In the light of Sarney´s earlier reluctance to change this set of 
incentives, and the protests it provoked from important organizations of ranchers in the 
region, this move was a highly significant retreat.20  
 In February 1989, the final report from the working groups was delivered to 
president Sarney. During the following months, several laws, decrees and administrative acts 
were approved. A package of actions by the government was published on 10. April  1989, of 
which only the most important are mentioned here.  One decree prohibited the disbursement 
of official rural credit and fresh fiscal incentives for agricultural and ranching enterprises in 
forest areas in Legal Amazonia until a definitive zoning of Legal Amazonia into various user 
purposes had taken place. A second decree prohibited the use of fire for the clearing of new 
land.  A third decree made it obligatory for companies that consume timber as a raw material, 
such as sawmills, metal industries and celulose industries to present integrated plans for 
meeting their demand with planted raw material to the newly created environmental body 
IBAMA. 
 IBAMA, the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Resources 
(IBAMA), was also created in February. IBAMA emerged by merging a set of already 
existing small and neglected21 federal bodies responsible for resource exploitation and the 
environment. This was the Special Secretariat for the Environment (SEMA), the Brazilian 
Forest Institute (IBDF) and two other agencies responsible for fishing and rubber production. 
For the first time, an executive body dealing both with urban pollution and the use of natural 
resources was established. The new body was an autarchy under the Ministry of the Interior, a 
legal status that made the body able to add income from the distribution of fines and other 
                                                 
19 The groups addressed the following topics: Forest cover in Amazonia, Chemical substances and inadequate 
processes in mining, Structure of the administrative system for environmental protection, Environmental 
education, Research and Protection of the environment, indigenous communities and populations involved in 
extractive activities. 
20 For protests against Sarney´s cancellation of fiscal incentives, see for example the article: «Emprésarios 
criticam as restrições impostas a projetos agropecuários», Folha de São Paulo, 12 October, 1988:C-2. 
Confirmed in own interview with Fernando Mesquita, president of IBAMA under Sarney,  November 1993. 
21For a further analysis of the neglect of these bodies, see Guimarães´ (1991)  and Foresta (1991). 
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activities to its government funding. The new body was also decentralized, with the majority 
of its employees in special state branches. IBAMA was put under the command of Sarney´s 
press secretary, Fernando Mesquita, who was also a close political ally of Sarney from the 
state of Maranhão. 
 The main accomplishment of IBAMA in 1989 was the implementation of a 
surveillance and inspection programme for the Amazon region called the Emergency 
Programme for Legal Amazonia (PEAL). PEAL was co-financed by transferring 30 percent 
of World Bank funding for the POLONOROESTE programme in Rondônia/Mato Grosso to 
IBAMA. 70 inspection groups (of them 50 mobile) consisting of about 1,000 persons from 
the Federal Police, the Road Ministry, the Marine Ministry, state environmental secretariats 
and the Forest Police patrolled the Amazon region. The programme was assisted by 
observations from the meteorological satellite NOAA (which is especially suitable for fire 
detection) channeled through the Brazilian Space Agency, and by observations from airline 
pilots. Nine helicopters assisted the surveillance activities and increased the mobility of the 
inspection groups (Arnt & Schwartzman 1992:287). Before November 1989, 838 penalties 
had been applied in the Legal Amazon (IBAMA 1989:3, undated). Rondônia was the state 
which attracted the highest number of penalties with 382 (Arnt & Schwartzman 1992:287).22 
The PEAL programme provoked strong protests among ranchers and their organizations in 
the Amazon region.  Complaints from governors and federal deputies from the Amazon 
region representing farmers and commercial interests talking about a «massacre of fines» 
from IBAMA indicate that the new surveillance programme constituted a major, qualitative 
change of government attitude to law enforcement.23
 Other areas of reform under Sarney related to Amazonia were of a more 
contradictory nature. Though a series of new national forests, extractive reserves for rubber 
tappers and reserves for indigenous populations was created, these decisions do not expose 
                                                 
22Also other key regions received increased attention. In 30 days of monitoring and inspection, the 6 teams that 
accomplished the so-called "Operation Carajás" started legal proceedings against 3 pig iron producers (which 
had not carried out their required reforestation plans), 22 sawmills (which had aquired timber illegally) and 
1.110 vehicles (for not having licences for timber transport and for carrying species which exploitation was 
prohibited) (Arnt & Schwartzman 1992:287). According to Hall (1991:298), in July 1989, the SIMARA pig-
iron smelter in the city of Marabá was fined the equivalent of USD 0,5 million by IBAMA for buying illegally 
cut timber, and was forced to suspend its operations (see also Margolis 1992:127). The larger COSIPAR smelter 
(owned by the Minas Gerais steel company Itaminas), also in Marabá, was fined the equivalent of USD 25.000 
for similar offences, but continued its operations (Hall 1991:298).  
23Though these actions involved a clear step-up of law enforcement in Amazonia, legal barriers curbed the 
effects of government action. According to Fernando Mesquita, IBAMA only managed to collect about 2 
percent of the fines given to trespassers of the forest law (Jornal do Brasil, 11 October 1990:12).This happened 
because the routines for collection were excessively bureaucratic. The offenders first turned to IBAMA for 
reassessement, and after that tried the cases for the court. Until a year could pass before the fine was paid by the 
offender (Arnt & Schwartzman 1992:289). This problem was tried solved during the last months of the Sarney 
government. Laws and provisory neasures gave IBAMA the authority to collect fines without waiting for court 
decisions from February 1990. However, bureaucratic and judicial problems have continued to hamper 
IBAMA´s capacity in this respect (interviews with IBAMA presidents 1990-1993).  
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the same willingness to discipline private investors as the monitoring and surveillance 
programme. The establishment of a series of national forests between 1986 and 1990 should 
not be considered as involving a strong priority of environmental concerns over commercial 
interests. National forests in general permit limited extraction of natural resources, like 
minerals, and are generally badly policed. In addition, the establishment of national forests in 
areas belonging to Indians according to the 1988 Constitution and was used as a deliberate 
instrument to secure the access of small-scale placer mining as well as other commercial 
interests to indigenous reserves (Albert 1992, Allen 1992). This was most pronounced in 
decisions regarding the huge Yanomani reservation in Roraima. Sarney´s response to the gold 
rush of placer miners into the Yanomani reserve, poisoning the forest ecosystem with 
mercury pollution and mistreating its native inhabitants, was a 1989 decree that broke the 
reserve up in 19 pieces and encouraged further immigration (Albert 1992, Allen 1992).24
  
3.3. Sarney´s Policies: Evaluation and Explanation 
Though introducing important changes to curb greenhouse gas emissions from 1988, the 
Sarney government´s policies were perceived as half-hearted by the international community. 
A key reason for this was the lack of reform related to some of the focal points of external 
pressure. In contrast to institutional and legal reform related to the forest code and the 
environmental bureaucracy, as we have seen, neither foreign policy positions nor policies 
related to indigenous populations were changed. The Nossa Natureza environmental plan was 
wrapped up in a nationalist hard-line rhetoric that tended to overshadow the substantial 
progresses in the new policy.25 In addition to continued international outcries regarding the 
situation of Amazonia´s indigenous populations because of the unwillingness of the Sarney 
government to reform this section of policies in the region, the lack of foreign policy reform 
precluded any substantial decrease of pressure on Brazil.26
 Thus, the policy shift under Sarney may be analysed from two angles. First, we may 
ask why reforms emerged at all. Second, we may ask why the strong reluctance to push on 
with reforms in certain areas persisted. 
 The partial shift away from intransigent hard-line nationalism that emerged in 1988 is 
almost completely explained by external pressure. Though there was an important 
                                                 
24The fragmentation of the Yanomami territory was formulated in Interministerial Directive 160 of September 
1988 and Interministerial Directive 250 of November 1988.  
25The following statement from  IBAMA´s first president, Fernando Mesquita, during a visit to Amazonia in 
February 1989 is typical for the Sarney government´s position (my translation from Portuguese): «(-) the 
Brazilians do not permit the improper interference of strangers in the preservation of the ecology of Amazonia 
and consider this as an offense to our sovereignty» (Correio Braziliense  10. February 1989:9). 
26Bad luck also played a role. In December 1988,  Chico Mendes, the world famous leader of the rubber tapper 
movement in Acre, was brutally murdered by ranchers. This event provoked an international outcry that 
associated the murder with the Sarney government and the military´s policies in the region. 
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environmental opposition which had emerged after the end of the military dictatorship in 
1985, this movement was clearly not strong enough neither to put the problem of climate 
change on the Brazilian political agenda, nor to exert effective pressure on the government. In 
the context of economic crisis and hyper-inflation after 1986, it was very difficult for 
Brazilian NGOs to raise the issue of climate change to a significant position on the political 
agenda. In the wake of the national debate on Amazonia, there was an increasing interest in 
environmental issues in general in the media, but the environment and Amazonia assumed 
only moderate importance in the presidential campaigns in 1989, and seemed to assume only 
secondary importance for the electorate (Hurrell 1992:413). In addition, global problems like 
climate change were victims of the heterogenity of the Brazilian NGO movement. While 
some new, middle-class based NGOs like FUNATURA27 and SOS Mata Atlantica (both 
created in 1986) were addressing global environmental problems, other environmental NGOs 
had a socio-environmental view based on the needs of the urban poor and political loyalties to 
parties on the left. On occasions, these NGOs supported parts of the anti-imperialist rhetoric 
of the Sarney government, for example by denouncing debt-for-nature swaps.28 Such 
cleavages made it difficult to establish an united environmental stance (Hurrell 1992:413, 
Viola 1988). 
 However, the environmental movement had real impact on one important aspect of the 
environmental policy-making process under Sarney. A «green block» of federal deputies from 
a broad spectrum of political parties was successful in putting several articles on 
environmental protection into the new 1988 constitution. In one of these articles (art. 225, § 
4), Amazonia was mentioned as a «national patrimony» demanding special federal attention 
along with 4 other major Brazilian biomes (Pantanal, the Atlantic Rainforest, the Coastal 
Zone and the Serra do Mar mountain range). Other articles (231-232) also demanded a 
protective attitude towards indigenous populations and confirmed the property rights of these 
populations to their territories; clauses most relevant to the preservation of Amazonia as the 
overwhelming majority of Indian lands is situated in this region. 
 But it is difficult to argue that the constitutional clauses on the environment were 
decisive for the adoption of the “Nossa Natureza plan”. Fernando Mesquita, president of 
IBAMA from its creation until the end of the Sarney administration and a close associate of 
Sarney, emphasizes that neither national NGOs nor the constitutional requirements had any 
                                                 
27Of the two organizations, FUNATURA has the most extensive focus on Amazonia as it has done research for 
sub-sections of the PMACI (The Plan for the Protection of the Environment and Indigenous Communities) for 
the pavement of the Porto Velho-Rio Branco highway financed by the Interamerican Development Bank (Arnt 
& Schwartzman 1992:303). FUNATURA also arranged a series of seminars on Amazonia in 1988-1989, 
bringing together NGOs and scientists to make suggestions to guidelines for environmental management in the 
region (FUNATURA 1990:2). 
28For this conflict, see the interview  with FUNATURA´s president Maria Tereza Jorge Padua in Jornal do 
Brasil, 30. March 1992:3. 
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significant impact on this decision. Foreign pressure was the dominating motive of the 
government.29 This is also illustrated by comparing with the case of indigenous populations. 
Constitutional requirements for the protection of the lands of indigenous populations were 
much clearer than the requirements for protection of the Amazon. However, while the 
constitutional articles on indigenous populations were sabotaged in the name of national 
security, as described in more detail below, the more general article on Amazonia was 
followed up to a surprising extent. 
 A second possible candidate as a force behind the change under Sarney, the 
environmental bodies of SEMA and IBDF, were possibly even a weaker national impetus 
behind environmental reforms than the environmental movement. SEMA was established in 
1973 to provide an environmental image for Brazil and to satisfy needs for an environmental 
agency as a required counterpart for international financing. Both bodies were extremely 
peripheral in the Brazilian bureaucracy (Guimarães 1991:143-211, Viola 1992:9). The head 
of SEMA, Messias Franco, quitted in 1988 because the Minister for Social Questions, Prisco 
Viana, refused to sign a decision prohibiting the use of mercury in mining in Amazonia 
(Folha de São Paulo, 20. September 1988:2). More generally, Franco justified his request for 
dismissal by pointing to the lack of political will to deal with the environment in a serious 
way (Guimarães 1991:200, O Globo, 25. September 1988:18).30  The IBDF was in a state of 
disarray and economic crisis during the late 1980s, and was hardly able to maintain its 
internal regime, let alone to exert influence on the government (Foresta 1991:163-188). 
 Now, given that the change of policies related to climate change under Sarney is 
most adequately explained by pointing to external pressure, we may ask why reforms were so 
unevenly distributed over various areas? While parts of the policy related to environmental 
monitoring and incentive changes were rather progressive, foreign policies and the policies 
related to Indians very much resembled policies under the military dictatorship. Most of the 
answer to this question is to be found in the persisting influence of the military. The military 
enjoyed a very high degree of influence over the policy-making process under the Sarney 
government, and especially so in relation to Amazonia (Allen 1992, Flynn 1993, Zirker & 
Henberg 1994).  
 Both the Nossa Natureza plan and other regional planning in the Amazon region 
was in the hands of the military. The main military actor behind the shaping of this policy was 
general Rubens Bayma Denys from the Secretariat for Defence and Strategic Affairs 
(SADEN/PR). Bayma Denys, the Secretary-General of SADEN/PR, headed the executive 
                                                 
29Own interview with Fernando Mesquita, December 1993 
30For details of Franco´s more general criticism of the Sarney government´s and Minister of the Interior, João 
Alves Filho´s environmental policies, see «Messias Franco reafirma criticos a Ministro em simpósio», O Globo, 
25 September  1988:18. Two years before, the former leader of SEMA, Paulo Nogueira Neto, had quitted as 
head of SEMA for the same reasons as Franco (Guimarães 1991:200). 
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committee responsible for the Nossa Natureza plan. Five other members of this body also 
participated in the executive committee (Albert 1992:50). SADEN/PR was represented in all 
the interministerial planning groups. Bayma Denys and SADEN/PR were already involved in 
the planning of the Calha Norte project; a project that aimed to increase military and civilian 
presence in border areas in the Amazon region. The body was generally perceived as a 
staunch supporter of the military´s grand vision of a conquest of Amazonia justified by a need 
to decrease border vulnerability (Allen 1992).  
 The persisting influence of the military´s vision was especially significant for policies 
related to indigenous areas. Albert (1992) demonstrates how SADEN was able to take full 
control over this policy area and implement a de facto  fragmentation and opening of the 
lands of the Yanomani tribe in the state of Roraima for gold miners and the prospecting 
activities of the larger mining companies. These acts were guided by a strategically motivated 
fear that indigenous populations inhabiting the border regions could pose a threat to security 
in Amazonia´s border areas through subversion and alliances with foreign powers. A later 
statement (1990) from the military commander of Amazonia that «the presence of the 
garimpeiro  (gold miner) has strategic importance for the occupation of the territory» clearly 
reveals the motive for this policy (Isto é, 4. April 1990). 
 The foreign policy of the Sarney government was shaped through the 
cooperation of the military, most notably SADEN, and Itamaraty. For Amazonia, this 
cooperation was especially clear, as the official reactions to the pressure on Brazil in this 
period both touched upon the perceived strategic vulnerability of Amazonia and the region´s 
importance for growth and development. Cooperation in the 1980s between the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the army regarding  a complex of diplomacy and military policies 
directed to decrease the vulnerability of the border regions of the Amazon confirms this 
picture of foreign policy making (Miyamoto 1989). Miyamoto (1989) analyses both the 
military Calha Norte border project and the revival of the Brazil-initiated Amazon pact (1978) 
in the 1980s as an unitary political initiative, shaped by the cooperation between Itamaraty 
and sections of the armed forces. This interpretation is supported by the fact that a 
revitalization of the Amazon Pact was included in the report from an interministerial group 
responsible for outlining the Calha Norte project in further detail (Allen 1992:74). The 
Amazon Pact is a treaty between Brazil and its neighbouring countries in the Amazon region 
which basic idea was to pre-empt territorial disputes and rivalry. Under president Sarney, it 
was revived both as an instrument under the Calha Norte project and as a tool for the 
construction of a coalition of Amazon states against ecological criticism from the 
industrialized countries (Santilli 1989). In May 1989, an Amazon pact summitt was held in 
Manaus on Brazilian intiative. Here, Brazil´s nationalist position was restated in a declaration 
supported by all the members of the pact, also including a rejection of strings and 
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conditionality on multilateral financing motivated by considerations for global environmental 
problems (Hurrell 1992:407, Cleary 1991:25). 
 Zirker & Henberg (1994:264-265) discuss these findings  in the light of Alfred 
Stepan´s (1988) observations of the military and politics in Brazil. Stepan describes the 
Brazilian political regime after 1985 as being on the margin of not being a democracy because 
of the existence of far-reaching military prerogatives, providing privileged military access to 
decision-making in the government, the legislature and state companies. In the light of the 
definition of democracy put forward by Rueschemeyer et al. (1992:43-44), where the 
accountability of the state to an elected parliament is one of three key indicators of a 
democracy, such doubt on the democratic nature of the Brazilian political regime under 
Sarney may be justified.31 However, as we have seen, other segments of the state also 
enjoyed privileges over environmental decision-making in this period. The Itamaraty shaped 
policies related to Amazonia and climate change to a large extent on the basis of their own 
initiative and their cooperation with the military. Also, the resistance to change in other 
centers of the Brazilian bureaucracy should not be played down. The military´s geopolitical 
vision of Amazonia may have penetrated the Brazilian bureaucracy in a more general way as 
lots of technocrats and government advisers have participated in courses in «politics and 
strategy» held by the military «think-tank» ESG (the Superior War College) (Folha de Sáo 
Paulo, 25. July 1991: A-12). 
 However, these observations on the continued influence of the military over policies 
related to the problem of climate change may also suggest that the first democratic 
presidential elections in Brazil since 1960 held in 1989 might provide and impetus for 
change. And this is exactly what happened.  
 
 
 
4. The Collor presidency 1990-92 - reforms in a context of waning state power  
The first democratically elected president in 20 years, Fernando Collor de Mello, was 
inaugurated in March 1990. His presidential period, 1990-92, is marked by vigorous reforms 
related to Amazonia essentially motivated by concerns for global environmental problems, of 
which climate change was the most predominant.  
 The first document on the environmental policies of the Collor government was a  
77 page document presented  between the first and the second round of presidential elections 
in 1989 (Collor, undated). The document was written by Helio Setti, an activist from the 
                                                 
31Rueschemeyer et al. (1992:43) define the two other key indicators as regular, free and fair elections of 
representatives with universal and equal suffrage and the freedoms of expression and association as well as the 
protection of such individual rights against arbitrary state action.  
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environmental movement focused on the protection of Brazil´s Atlantic rainforest.  The 
document provided the main background for the environmental reforms of the Collor 
presidency (1990-92) also in relation to Amazonia, and was written with more than one eye at 
global environmental problems. Priority areas were effective zoning efforts in the region 
aiming to identify areas for protection and economic exploitation, a system of permanent 
monitoring of the most vulnerable regions, creation of new conservation units and better 
inspection services in these areas, development of less predatory agricultural systems, 
strengthened state and municipal environmental administration, cancel the natural forest-
based iron production poles in the Great Carajás programme, increase the amount of 
extractive reserves and accelerate the demarcation of indigenous areas with a special priority 
on the Yanomani reserve (Collor undated:17-22). These propositions were not implemented 
through coherent «policy packages» to the same extent as under the Sarney government. 
Rather, reforms came in uneven clusters. 
 The first step taken by the Collor government was to establish a secretariat for the 
environment, SEMAM/PR. SEMAM´s status as a secretariat directly connected to the 
president of the republic implied that Brazil for the first time got an environmental agency 
with a voice at the level of government. IBAMA was transferred from the Ministry of the 
Interior, and was now the executive body of the new secretariat. The new secretary of the 
environment was José Lutzenberger; deep-ecologist and a world famous veteran from the 
Brazilian environmental movement.  
 The system for incentives encouraging deforestation was further revised in the 
1990-92 period. The suspension of fiscal incentives for ranching in the forest areas of Legal 
Amazonia was continued until a new law for the application of regional fiscal incentives was 
decided in January 1991. The new law together with subsequent decrees made the approval of 
fiscal incentives for crop and livestock activities dependent on the previous consent of the 
Secretariat of Strategic Affairs (SAE, the inheritor of SADEN), the National Institute of 
Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA), IBAMA, SEMAM and  the National Indian 
Foundation (FUNAI). It also gave IBAMA the authority to inspect the environmental aspects 
of all projects and eventually cancel them. This implied a notable extension of power for 
IBAMA, SEMAM and FUNAI.  
 The Great Carajás area programme was also revised further under the new 
government. After the initiative of the government, directives were established for the Great 
Carajás programme, significantly altering the legal basis of the programme. These directives 
demand that the steel and iron companies in the Great Carajás project have to comply to a 
new set of regulations to be eligible for regional fiscal incentives. The new regulations 
implied the obligation to fuel factories with other energy sources than native forests and to 
use energy conserving technologies in production. Together with the general environmental 
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criteria for approval of SUDAM fiscal incentives for projects, these detailed provisions for 
the provision of fiscal incentives for wood-consuming steel industries implied a considerable 
change of incentives for ecologically devastating projects connected to wood-consuming 
industries and agriculture. In addition to these incentive changes, a 1990 decree also charged 
IBAMA with the obligation to give priority to the Great Carajás area in their surveillance and 
monitoring operations.  
 Surveillance and monitoring efforts were also further increased in the 1990-92-period. 
In June 1990, the Collor administration introduced a programme to combat deforestation and 
fires in Amazonia popularly called «Operation Amazonia» (Gazeta Mercantil, 5. June 
1990:15). It implied a more sophisticated connection between inspection and satellite 
monitoring. In cooperation with the Brazilian Space Agency, a new system that linked 
satellite fire observations with IBAMA´s regional offices within hours was successfully 
introduced (Cleary 1991:39). Field personnel and journalists reported an increase of IBAMA 
inspection in Amazonia in the dry season of 1990 compared to the previous year (Margolis 
1992:308).32 The amount of fines distributed increased and routines for their collection were 
considerably improved.33  Politicians from Amazonia speaking on behalf of economic 
interests punished by IBAMA in 1990 and 1991 complained about the change.34 According to 
IBAMA sources, the body was able to detect and punish trespassers of prohibitions of 
deforestation at an area of 96,305 hectares in the dry season before 30. October  1991.35 This 
was just below 9 percent of estimated deforested area this year according to the Brazilian 
Space Agency (INPE), a number which strengthens the assumption that «Operation 
Amazonia» had a substantial demonstration effect in many areas. Several large companies got 
heavy fines.36 However, though monitoring received high priorities, it is also clear that 
funding for the environmental bureaucracy  declined substantially under Collor. In 1992, this 
                                                 
32According to Dr. Luis Alberto Vieira Dias at the Brazilian Space Agency INPE, «Operation Amazonia» used 
an improved methodology. In PEAL, weather satelites (NOAA) for fire detection were used, while «Operation 
Amazonia» used more detailed images from the land monitoring satelite LANDSAT. Personal communication 
March 1995. 
33Interview  with  former  IBAMA leader Tania Munhoz November 1992. On the improvement of the collection 
of fines, see Jornal do Brasil,  11. October 1990:12. 
34Jarbas Passarinho, senator from Pará, concluded in interview that there had been a change and that 
the implementation of rules became stiffer from 1990. See also the discussion later on in this paper regarding the 
opposition against «Operation Amazonia». Dr. Luis Alberto Vieira Dias at INPE emphasizes that even though 
funding for «Operation Amazonia» was far from sufficient, the programme represented a strong improvement 
compared to previous years: «...to put ten helicopters available to this program was an unheard effort in Brazil. 
Previously we had none!» 
35Sources at IBAMA.  
36Examples of this are the company Mineração Taboca, a subsidiary of the Brazilian mining giant 
Paranapanema, and the Jerdau logging company. Mineração Taboca was fined with about USD 1,1 million  for 
its operations in the cassiterite mine at Pitinga in the state of Amazonas (Jornal do Brasil, 11 October 1990:12). 
The company had been infamous for years because of its unpunished ecological disturbances of the Waimiri 
Atroara Indian reserve close to the mine (Fearnside 1990:210). 
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also hampered monitoring and surveillance operations as funding dried out.37 The Collor 
government´s general record with reference to protected areas other than indigenous reserves 
must be characterized as poor. Though the definition of new conservation units continued, 
large budget cuts for IBAMA rendered the already underfunded national parks in a state of 
disarray.38 At this level, policy changes under Collor were more rhetorical than substantial 
(Viola 1992:14). 
 Another area of reform under Collor, the increased attention to the demands and rights 
of Amazonia´s indigenous populations, marks a very clear contrast to policies under Sarney. 
Though the first year of the Collor government was characterized by only symbolic policies 
like the detonation of the airstrips of gold miners in the Yanomani-reserve in Roraima without 
further action to improve the legal status of the reserve, this changed quite rapidly after Collor 
sacked FUNAI´s president in June 1991 and put the respected career Indianist, Sidney 
Possuelo, in this position. Possuelo launched a more determined policy of definition and 
demarcation of areas for indigenous populations, backed up by president Collor and the 
Minister of Justice, Jarbas Passarinho.39  In addition to the famous decision to recognize and 
demarcate the whole Yanomani reservation in Roraima as exclusively belonging to the 
indigenous populations in November 1991, a long series of other reservations were defined 
and decided demarcated in the 1991-92 period. Even though demarcation of the areas has 
proceeded  slowly, the contrast with the Sarney government is substantial and clearly 
recognized by Brazilian NGOs supporting indigenous populations and other observers.40
 Foreign policy positions on the environment in general, and on climate change were 
also dramatically revised. Collor´s position in this field was a profound contrast to the 
position of the Sarney government from the outset. In his inaugural speech, only the 
economic liberalization programme received priority over environmental questions (Cleary 
1991:117). The change of positions under Collor is demonstrated by the following statement 
by Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja, secretary-general for foreign policy, in  
December 1990 (Brazil 1991:9):  
 
«It is precisely because these are also concerns of the Brazilian society and of Brazil´s Government that we 
understand that the international community has a right to be concerned by the violation of human rights and by 
the damage done to the environment wherever they may occur. In dealing with these and other issues, Brazil no 
longer   [my Italic] resorts to allegations of sovereignty to deflect criticism. Instead, it shoulders its 
responsibilities, conscious that its actions have repercussions for the whole planet.» 
                                                 
37 See Correio Braziliense  24. May 1992:18. The state superintendent of IBAMA in Pará, Reginaldo Anaisse, 
complained that funding for air surveillance had decreased to a very low level in 1992 (own interview 
November 1992). 
38Between 1989 and 1992, federal expenditures on conservation units seem to have been reduced by more than 
75 percent (World Bank 1994:280). 
39Own interview with Possuelo, July 1994. Possuelo´s cooperation with Collor was remarkably intensive, given 
the peripheral position of FUNAI in the bureaucracy. He had personal meetings with Collor more often than 
once a month where questions related to FUNAI and indigenous populations were discussed. 
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This also involved a new willingness to admit the necessity of actions to address and 
counteract the problem of climate change. A specific forest protocol under the Climate 
Convention was also supported to address the problem of deforestation (in both boreal, 
temperate, subtropical and tropical forests); a marked change of position from the Sarney 
government. The Brazilian government now also officially supported joint implementation of 
the Climate Convention; providing states with the opportunity to obtain credits under the 
convention by investing in measures against greenhouse gas emissions also in other 
countries.  
 Preparations for the UNCED conference, which the Collor government worked hard 
to locate to Brazil, also involved unique opportunities for influence for environmental NGOs, 
who participated in the groups that prepared Brazil´s positions. 
However, it is also important to be aware that the foreign policy change was partially 
neutralized by the negotiators from the Itamaraty. Both the interim Secretary for the 
Environment, José Goldemberg and Brazilian environmental NGOs were dissatisfied with 
the operationalization of the Brazilian position in the negotiations on climate and 
biodiversity.41  This brings us from mere descriptions of policy change under the Collor 
government to analysis. 
 
4.3. Collor´s policies: evaluation and explanation 
Most commentators conclude that the main motive for the development of a more cooperative 
position on the environment and climate change under Collor is to be found in his economic 
programme. Collor´s core political project was to modernize Brazil through extensive 
privatization, trade liberalization and increased cooperation with the industrialized countries. 
Both in his inaugural speech as a president, and in the introduction of the environmental 
planning document, the change of positions on the environment is explicitly linked to an 
improvement of Brazil´s relationship with the industrialized world and the economic reform 
programme (Collor, undated:4, my translation from Portuguese): 
 
«I am conscious that if Brazil does not confront the environmental question internally and externally, this will 
make our programmes for economic development and international financing difficult.» 
                                                 
41 See the article «ONGs pressionam por posição oficial», Jornal do Brasil,  14 November 1991:7. Goldemberg, 
who participated in the groups that defined Brazil´s international positions in the preparations for the UNCED 
conference and was actively involved in the shaping of Brazil´s official positions, describes the ministry´s role 
in the negotiations like this: «(..) Itamaraty  was always defensive and at one point they were ordered to follow 
instructions on the Climate Convention and take less confrontational attitudes to the industrialized countries.» 
Personal interview  with Ana Maria Fonseca (FBCN) who confirmed Goldemberg´s statement, and complained 
about Itamaraty´s defensive attitude on patents in the biodiversity negotiations.  The generally negative 
impression  of Itamaraty´s ability to respond to the positions defined in the groups was also confirmed by Cesar 
Victor do Espírito Santo, adjunct leader  of the environmental NGO FUNATURA, in interview in November 
1993. See Viola (1993:18) for a slightly more sympathetic  evaluation of the Brazilian position. 
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Most commentators conclude that the main explanation of the change of environmental 
policies is to be found in this connection between the environment (especially Amazonia) and 
the new economic programme, and not in internal pressure from NGOs, which influence on 
Collor and his presidential campaign was quite low (Hurrell 1992, Viola 1993). This version 
is also explicitly supported by key members of the government.42 In addition, the prospects of 
the Rio-conference, increased this motivation as it increased the international attention to 
environmental policies in Brazil. However, to see this pressure as external pressure of the 
same kind as the pressure on the Sarney government is misleading, as the decision to place 
the UNCED in Brazil was wholeheartedly supported by the Collor government itself. Thus, 
UNCED was rather the hallmark of a less defensive environmental policy than a new source 
of external pressure.  
 Alternative explanations pointing to the strength of environmental NGOs or the 
environmental bureaucracy as explanations of the Collor reforms are more difficult to 
defend. For environmental NGOs, some of the IBAMA presidents, most notably Edouardo de 
Souza Martins (1991-92), who was also adjunct secretary of SEMAM, had an extensive 
informal dialogue with the NGO movement.43 Of course, also the choice of Maria Tereza 
Jorge Padua, leader of the environmental NGO FUNATURA, as president of IBAMA during 
a few months in 1992 demonstrated a willingness to involve NGO representatives in 
decision-making. But none of these NGO representatives were involved in Collor´s initial 
decision to change Brazilian policies related to Amazonia. The political resources controlled 
by environmental NGOs were still too modest to make these organizations able to push 
successfully for major changes.  
 Neither was the environmental bureaucracy influential enough to bring about policy 
change. Though it was strengthened through the establishment of SEMAM, this 
strengthening was a symptom, not a cause of the policy change. IBAMA experienced serious 
organizational difficulties, and demonstrated low activity as an environmental lobby.44  
 There were also strong economic forces that hampered reform efforts. In 1990, Collor 
introduced a draconic austerity plan to curb inflation and deal more effectively with the huge 
deficit of the public sector. As part of these policies, funding for public bodies like IBAMA 
was considerably decreased (Carvalho 1991). These cuts did not damage policies like the 
changes in fiscal incentives and foreign policy, but they reduced the capacity of IBAMA, 
FUNAI and SEMAM to accomplish their day-to-day duties, not to mention the long-term 
construction of viable public environmental sector. Though the drastic economic measures 
                                                 
42Own interviews with the ex-ministers José Goldemberg and Jarbas Passarinho November/December 1992. 
43Own interviews with Edouardo de Souza Martins, November 1993, and Ana Maria Fonseca (FBCN) 
November/December 1993. 
44Various interviews at IBAMA October 1992 and December 1993. 
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chosen by Collor were exaggerated and also ineffective as solutions of the country´s major 
economic problems (inflation rates continued to skyrocket), they were perhaps also 
symptoms of the very narrow range of options to developing countries that are charged with 
the necessity of environmental reform and fiscal austerity imposed by the hostile economic 
climate of the 1980s (Altvater 1987).  
 Continued protests from the military and their civilian allies also contributed to 
hamper reforms. It was demonstrated that though the military was in a much more peripheral 
position under Collor than under Sarney, this section of the bureaucracy still commanded 
substantial political resources. In the Collor government, the military ministers were main 
opponents of reforming  policies in Amazonia.45 But military opposition was not limited to 
intra-governmental protests. The army and regional politicians orchestrated a campaign 
against what they called the «internationalization of Amazonia». These accusations were 
promoted both by regional politicians like Gilberto Mestrinho, the governor of Amazonas,  
and military bureaucrats like the commander of the general staff of Amazonia, Thaumaturgo 
Sotero Vaz. ADESG, a diplomatic affiliate of the war college ESG joined in the campaign 
against environmental reforms with their support to the campaign against the 
«internationalization of Amazonia» in 1991 (Folha de Sáo Paulo,  25. July 1991:A-12). So 
did also the military institutions Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exército  (ECEME) 
and Centro Brasileiro de Estudos Estratégicos  (CEBRES) by hosting a seminar on the 
external threat to Amazonia in October 1991 in which high-ranking officers as well as 
regional politicians  participated (O Globo, 14. October 1991:7).  
 The campaign against the «internationalization» of Amazonia was rhetorically 
centered on foreign policy and the demarcation of indigenous territories, but was of course 
also inspired by resistance from commercial interests. These interests pressed for favors like 
the cancellation of fines, licenses for environmentally dubious projects and the appointment 
of easily controlled political clients in positions as IBAMA state superintendents (Kasa 1994).  
 Amazonian politicians were involved in the dismissal of Tania Munhoz from the 
position as  president of IBAMA in 199146 and the firing of Lutzenberger as Secretary for the 
Environment in 1992.47
  A special congressional investigation (CPI) on the «internationalization» of 
Amazonia in 1991 was led by Atila Lins, deputy from Amazonas. The CPI was widely 
supported among Amazonian politicians. Among the proposals of the CPI were the reduction 
of indigenous territories, limitations on IBAMA´s surveillance and inspection activities in the 
region, the creation of new investment funds and the revitalization of the Calha Norte military 
                                                 
45Own interview with former Secretary of the Environment, José Goldemberg November 1992. 
46Folha de Sáo Paulo, 3. October 1991:A-10, own interview with Goldemberg November 1992. 
47Correio Braziliense, 23. March 1992:5, interviews with Feldman and an anonymous SEMAM adviser. 
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border protection project (Jornal do Brasil, 29. November 1991:4). During the investigation, 
the special committee also demanded the dismissal of Munhoz and Lutzenberger (Folha de 
São Paulo, 10. September 1991:A-14). The military was heavily involved in the CPI as 
ghostwriters of the first draft of the report from the investigation for the Amazon 
congressional group (Bernardo & Bastos 1993:18-19). 
 The high importance of the combination of external pressure and a liberalist 
economic programme as explanations of the Collor reforms was demonstrated by the 
government that followed Collor´s impeachment in September 1993.48 After the UNCED, a 
certain fatigue seems to have overcome the global environmental movement. This is also the 
case for the issue of  climate change. This decline of attention called attention away from 
Brazil and the country´s contributions to global environmental problems. At the same time, 
Itamar Franco, Collor´s vice-president, emerged as a very conventional and weak president. 
This implied closer cooperation with the military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
appointment of Coutinho Jorge, senator from the Amazon state of Pará, to the new position as 
Minister for the Environment in 1992 confirms this. Though Coutinho Jorge did not turn out 
to represent a full return to the destructive policies of the military regime, his administration 
was marked by a considerable decrease of initiatives related to Amazonia. Together, these 
impulses produced a  breakdown of Brazil´s wave of reforms in Amazonia.49 This has also 
been the case for policies on the issue of climate change. At various conferences on climate 
change, like the recent conference of the parties in Berlin or the UNDP conference on joint 
implementation in Rio in December 1994, Brazil was once again adopting non-cooperative 
and confrontational positions.50 The reversal of environmental policies also seems to have 
hurt the capacity of the environmental bureaucracy. Following the takeover of Franco, 
political parties regained control over employment policies in some of the most important 
regional branches of IBAMA, like the Amazon state of Pará. State superintendents were once 
again selected on the basis of connections to political parties (most notably the Brazilian 
                                                 
48Collor was impeached by the Congress after the disclosure of an enormous corruption scandal, see Flynn 
1993. 
49The following may provide a good example of the negative role of the Itamaraty. According to Sidney 
Possuelo at FUNAI, the Itamaraty refused to receive grants of 18 million USD from Germany to facilitate the 
demarcation of indigenous territories in February 1994. Personal communication with Possuelo August 1994. In 
1993, FUNATURA top staff complained about the negative attitude of Itamaraty to the ITTO 2000 rules on 
sustainable forestry, which were perceived as threats to Brazil´s sovereignty. Personal meeting  with 
FUNATURA staff in November 1993. 
50Own interviews with CICERO observers present at both conferences. There are still proponents of 
international cooperation in Brazil: At the UNDP conference, former Secretary of the Environment José 
Goldemberg was seen taking a nap in full public to demonstrate his dissatisfaction with the representative of the 
Itamaraty  who was delivering his speech. 
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Democratic Party, PMDB), making the implementation of any forest policy motivated by 
concerns for climate change very difficult.51
 
  
5. Conclusion  
Since the military demonstrated a strong interest in a continuation of a development policy for 
the Amazon region which would also imply massive emissions of greenhouse gases, a 
weakening of military prerogatives also opened opportunities for a revision of the hard-line 
nationalist position adopted by the Sarney government. Collor used the power that was given 
to him by an electionary majority to exploit this opportunity. However, for Collor, a revision 
of Brazil´s policies and positions on climate change were predominantly perceived as 
preconditions for his economic programme. Under Collor, environmental reforms became as 
much a subsection of foreign policies and economic policies as a policy in itself. This implied 
both continuity and change related to the Sarney government. Continuity  because the 
environment was still perceived as an element in a much broader set of policies, and change  
because it advanced from being a subfield of security policy to be a precondition for an 
economic programme. Partially, this reflects the nature of environmental policies, cutting 
across most sectors of public activities (Guimarães 1991:175-76). And partly it reflects 
changes in the global context, as the perception of Amazonia´s vulnerability by the Sarney 
government was inspired by the military´s perception of the ever-present danger of 
communist infiltration and subversion typical for the US-Soviet conflict, while Collor´s 
perception of Amazonia was connected to considerations for international trade and 
investments which assume importance in an unchallenged capitalist global political and 
economical order. But the lack of an independent environmental policy also reflects the 
weakness of Brazilian social movements with an interest in the preservation of Amazonia and 
a revision on positions of climate change versus a still centralized and autocratic state-
apparatus. Thus, on a topic like global environmental problems, and especially in relation to 
the vast and sparsely populated Amazon region, Brazil has yet to reach the stage in which 
civil society may effectively challenge the state apparatus and change policy outcomes 
without the assistance of external pressure.52  
                                                 
51This point is only based on interviews with employees at the headquarter of IBAMA in Brasília in Deccember 
1993, and needs further documentation to be presented as a fact.  
52In this respect, the NGO campaign to save another important Brazilian forest biome, the Atlantic rainforest, 
may be a good comparative case. The Atlantic rainforest is situated along the Brazilian coast from the North-
East to the South. It represents an unique ecosystem with very high biological diversity, but has been reduced to 
cover only small patches of its original extent because of agricultural extension and logging. Especially in the 
economically advanced and populated  southern and south-eastern states of Brazil, well organized NGOs have 
enjoyed a high degree of influence over environmental decision-making both at state and federal level and been 
strongly involved with IBAMA at different levels regarding surveillance and law enforcement as well as 
definition and protection of conservation areas. But it should be noted that a more advanced civil society is not 
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List of abbreviations: 
 
ADESG: Associação dos Diplomados da Escola Superior de Guerra - Association of 
Diplomats of the Brazilian War College. School for diplomats and high-ranking bureaucrats 
connected to the Brazilian War College (ESG).  
 
CEBRES: Centro Brasileiro de Estudos Estratégicos  - The Brazilian Center for Strategic 
Studies. Military research center. 
  
ECEME: Escola de Comando e Estado Maior  do Exeército -  the School  of the  Staff of  the 
Army.  
 
ESG: Escola Superior de Guerra  - The Brazilian War College. Important military «think 
tank». Main intellectual base of the generals behind the 1964 military coup. Established in 
1949, modeled on the US National War College.  
 
FUNAI: Fundação Nacional do Índio  - The National Indian Foundation. Federal Agency 
established in 1967 to protect Brazil´s indigenous populations.  
 
FUNATURA: Fundação Pro-Natureza  - Pro-Nature Foundation. Important and professional 
NGO established in 1986. Based in Brasilía. 
 
IBAMA:  Instituto Brasileiro do Meio Ambiente e dos Recursos Renováveis  - The Brazilian 
Institute for the Environment. Created by Sarney in 1989 as the main federal executive body 
for environmental affairs under the Ministry of the Interior. Under Collor transferred to 
SEMAM. 
 
IBGE:  Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística  - the Brazilian Institute for Geography 
and Statistics. The Brazilian census agency.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
the only contrast between Amazonia and the Atlantic Rainforest that may explain stronger and more successful 
political mobilization over the latter issue. Mobilization over the Atlantic Rainforest is also facilitated by the 
absence of military interest in the region. Interview  with Ana Maria Fonseca, FBCN and staff member of the 
Atlantic Rainforest Network (Rede da Mata Atlântica), December 1993. The Atlantic Rainforest Network  is a 
consortium of more than 70 NGOs and research institutions with strong activity on issues connected to the 
preservation of the Atlantic rainforest.  
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IBDF: Instituto Brasileiro do Desenvolvimento Florestal - The Brazilian Institute for Forest 
Development. Forest development agency established in 1967. Since 1989 integrated in 
IBAMA. 
 
INPE: Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais  - the Brazilian Space Agency. Earth station 
for satelite observations of the Brazilian territory. Responsible for estimates of Brazilian 
deforestation rates based on satelite observations. Also important as supplier of ground 
information supporting IBAMA´s environmental inspection campaigns in the Amazon region.  
 
SAE/PR:  Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos/Presidência da República  - The Secretariat 
for Strategic Affairs. Superior military planning secretariat directly connected to the 
president´s office. Established by Collor in 1990 as the inheritor of SADEN/PR. 
 
SADEN/PR: Secretaria de Assessoramento da Defesa Nacional/Presidência da República  - 
The Secretariat for National Defence. Superior military planning secretariat directly 
connected to the president´s office. Established in 1988 by changing the name of the former 
Secretariat-General of the National Defence Council.  
 
SEMAM/PR: Secretaria do Meio Ambiente/Presidência da República  - The Secretariat of 
the Environment. Superior environmental secretariat directly connected to the president´s 
office. Established by Collor in 1990. Closed down in 1992 and substituted with the Ministry 
for the Environment. 
 
SUDAM: Superintendéncia do Desenvolvimento da Amazônia  - Superintendency for the 
Development of Amazonia. Agency established by the military in 1966 to implement 
development efforts in Legal Amazonia. Headquarter in the city of Belém.
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